

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

August 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*  
SUBJECT: Minutes of the SRG Meeting held  
August 28, 1974

Attached are the minutes of the Senior Review Group meeting held August 28, 1974, to discuss Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare.

cc: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft  
Dr. David Elliott  
Richard Kennedy  
A. D. Clift

Attachments

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY *WA* NARA DATE *12/21/05*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING

August 28, 1974

Time and Place: 10:37 a.m. - 10:57 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

Participants:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Henry A. Kissinger	<u>ACDA:</u>	Dr. Fred Ikle Robert Miller Thomas Davies
<u>State:</u>	Robert Ingersoll Wreatham Gathright Helmut Sonnenfeldt	<u>NSC</u>	
<u>Defense:</u>	William Clements Robert Ellsworth Maj. Gen. W. Y. Smith	<u>Staff:</u>	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft Dr. David Elliott Michael Guhin Col. Clinton Granger James G. Barnum
<u>JCS:</u>	Lt. Gen. John Pauly		
<u>CIA:</u>	Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters [REDACTED]		

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

--The Working Group would draw up a negotiating scenario based on two premises: (1) that we would accept prohibitions on any military use of environmental modification techniques having long-term, widespread or especially severe effects (Option 2); and (2) that we would accept prohibitions on all military use of such techniques for hostile purposes (Option 3).

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BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/21/05



Secretary Kissinger: The subject of today's meeting is environmental warfare. I don't think this will be a long meeting. What I would like to do is clarify the major positions--see what they are--and then get your judgment as to whether we can send them forward to the President by memo for decision or whether we need an NSC meeting. My instincts are that we can probably do it by memo, but I have no fixed opinion on that. Fred (Dr. Ikle) would you like to sum up the situation?

Dr. Ikle: I guess I should start at the latest development, the Soviet UN resolution, which calls for a broad agreement that would prohibit influencing the environment and climate for military and any other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security. This, of course, came after our joint agreement at the Moscow Summit. Prior to the Joint Communique, the interagency study came out with three basic options: (1) that there would be no restraints on military use of environmental warfare; (2) that there would be prohibitions on military use of environmental modification techniques if they have long-term, widespread, or especially severe effects; and (3) broad prohibitions against all military use of such techniques. As I see it, there are only two issues we need to discuss: (1) what are the various positions on the three options, and (2) how should we handle the diplomatic part--the negotiations coming up in October--and the Soviet's UN resolution.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm less worried about the UN than I am about how to handle the bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. What I would like somebody to explain to me is OSD's position. Would it be unfair to say that OSD would rule out options one and three?

Mr. Clements: Henry, what bothers us--what is at issue now--is that we have no idea of Soviet capabilities and intentions in this field. We just don't understand what their point is in wanting restraints on environmental warfare.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it seems to me that it is this--that they want it all banned. I guess you could argue that they are beginning to think about the consequences of no restraints on such type of warfare and that they are sincerely concerned. You could argue that they don't want an agreement. But, the fact is that we are committed to bilateral negotiations on this thing. What is it that OSD objects to in Option Three? What is Option Two banning? How does Option One differ from the others?



Mr. Clements: Well, we feel that the Soviet decision to have bilateral talks has really preempted Option One.

Secretary Kissinger: This is true if you preclude it as an outcome of negotiations. But, what I'd like to get to--how is Option Two different from Option One?

Mr. Ellsworth: What Option Two does is prohibit the use of such things as earthquakes and tidal waves--that type of thing. Most of those things we're talking about in Option Two we don't have the capability or technology to do anyway.

Mr. Ingersoll: We can create earthquakes.

Secretary Kissinger: Not really. I remember all that fuss about the underground explosion in the Aleutians. Everybody thought that would create earthquakes, and it never happened.

Mr. Miller: Basically, Option Two would prohibit actions that would have long-term applications.

Secretary Kissinger: I know, but that's all double-talk. Just what sort of things would be prohibited under Option Two?

Mr. Ingersoll: Things that we don't know much about right now. I mean, tidal waves and those sorts of things we can't do. We're just speculating on things that we might be able to do in the years to come.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we are talking about things that we are not presently capable of doing.

Mr. Ingersoll: That's right, except for earthquakes.

Mr. Miller: And we can't do that unless the enemy moves onto the fault first!

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Secretary Kissinger: Just for my own education, is it possible to start an earthquake here and have it produce results somewhere else? I mean, you can't start an earthquake in Nevada and send it to Siberia, can you?



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Secretary Kissinger: Then you would have to get close to create an earthquake, no?

Mr. Clements: That's right, right on the spot.

Secretary Kissinger: We'd have to do it in Siberia then?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in this case, it seems a pity to me to ask for a bunch of studies just to have to give them up later. How do we conduct the negotiations with the Russians? How does OSD understand the options?

Mr. Clements: Our problem is that we don't understand the Russian motivation for an agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: I can understand their motivation. Number one, they probably wanted something to sign at the Summit. Number two, their technology is behind ours in almost all fields. They just might be worried about what we are doing and this would be a way to find out. Number three, they might be on to something and they want to prevent us from following them into it. Which of the three, I don't know, but I would think it would be one of the first two. That's just a gut feeling. Hal (Mr. Sonnenfeldt) what do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, first I think they are under some pressure to think about twenty years from now. No more than us, they don't want to spend billions of dollars on projects that may have no application. I think they must be doing some work of some kind on weather modification that we don't know about.

Secretary Kissinger: Clearly. Does Option Three prevent everything?

Mr. Ingersoll: Only techniques intended for hostile purposes.

Gen. Walters: And that is difficult to verify.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that in peacetime there is no



difference between Options Two and Three. In wartime, yes.

Mr. Clements: Yes, that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, whatever options we present to the President for decision, the operational results would not show up until there is a war, anyway. Research and development could go forward.

Mr. Ingersoll: It's impossible to distinguish whether research and development are being used for peaceful purposes or war in this circumstance.

Secretary Kissinger: In the event of a major war, I think we would have to reassess our position. I think they would too. Would someone here write a negotiating scenario that we can give the President. I think that Option One is excluded, we really have to decide only between Option Two or Three. Option Three is easy, it prohibits everything. Option Two centers on military uses that would not be prohibited. What we need is clearer instructions for our delegation.

Mr. Clements: We can work up the scenario.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have a working group? Let's have the working group do this and have it in a couple of days. Then I can move it on up to the President for decision. I'd like a negotiating scenario to send along.

As I understand it, the OSD option prohibits long-term uses of technical means to change the environment. The State and ACDA option would prohibit all hostile uses. Both positions permit research and development. The practical differences are really quite negligible.

Dr. Ikle: Would you like to consider the Russian UN resolution in the scenario?

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12-1

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SRB  
on  
Environmental  
Warfare  
Folder



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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY W NARA DATE 12/21/05

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE POLICE

The following list of officials will be attending a meeting this morning at 10:30 a.m., in the White House Situation Room:

State: Robert Ingersoll ✓  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt ✓  
Wreatham Gathright ✓

Defense: William Clements ✓  
Robert Ellsworth ✓  
Maj. Gen. W. Y. Smith ✓

JCS: Lt. Gen. John Pauly ✓

CIA: Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters  
[REDACTED]

ACDA: Dr. Fred Ikle ✓  
Robert Miller ✓  
Thomas Davies ✓

NOTE: Gen. Brown (JCS) is out of town and Mr. Colby is on leave.

eddy palanzo  
(x-3440)



*Handwritten notes:*  
M...  
Brown  
G...  
J...  
R...

12-1  
23 5

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY lh MADA DATE 12/21/05

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Kissinger: Well, it seems to me that it is this--that they want it all banned. I guess ~~you~~ <sup>could</sup> you argue that they are beginning to think about the consequences of no ~~restraints~~ restraints on such type of warfare and the

HENRY KISSINGER  
RECORDS

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SRG - Environmental Warfare

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BY ka NARA DATE 12/21/05



10:37 -

K. See, e.w. the out lay out. Also major  
you are + get policy of you which seem or  
NSC. Just pass by some no free opinion  
Fred seem up?

J. Start with Soviet UN-resolution, procedure of  
joint agreement. Power to that our last  
3 options. 1. no limits. 2. Western countries  
point 3. Broad prohibition. Really 2 views,  
What are you on 3 cuts + 2) how much  
displacement. UN.

K. Less worried about UN than health talks with  
Soviets. Get what I could and explain  
OSD position. Confine to say OSD will act  
they what we don't know what to do?

Cl. Henry looks in - answer now, no idea of  
I expect or intentions. We don't know who  
can point us

K. This what it all be bound. One of results  
of arms control - saying you could agree  
deeply about. Year could a. Best we  
are committed to say. What is it that OSD -  
what? But what is out 2 being? What  
do we negotiate last number. How opt 1 differ  
from opt 1.

Cl. we feel that Soviet doc to have talks  
referred opt 1.

K. This of procedure it as an outcome.  
outcome of what we go. What like to  
get - opt 2 is diff than opt 1

J. Use of equals, ocean, peace

J. Egan.

1. Not really. Alentase.

J. Bound - origin of long-term interest

K I know the - tax

What sort of the answer we provide.

J. They are about same now, especially  
No

1. Now we are possibly, cable of doing.

J. Expect per equities.

M. Every move on fault first.

J. But how about now.

1. For my own education, on an equal we  
sent Nevada to Sierra Leone?

E. No.

P. Military only as a guarantee.

Cl. A disturbance they. What have faults -  
shows equipment.

1. Have to get close, no?

Cl. About.

1. Have to do it in Sierra.

Cl. Yes.

1. If Alaska but none there.

M. Sierra - tidal wave.

1. Can't get a tidal wave - we can't  
determine tidal wave

M. Correct.

1. Just the what our - neg. but Russian

J. are free of our country that prohibits  
we don't know how to do.

1. open procedure on area.

J. True.

1. In this case, a policy for studies first to  
give the up. How do we conduct the  
neg. and OSD open?



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J. Egan.

1. Not really. Alentase.

J. Bound - origin of long-term current

K I know the - the

What sort of the current are possible.

J. They are about how now, especially

No

1. How are we possibly able to do it.

J. Expect per equities.

M. Every move on fault first.

J. But how about now.

1. For my own education, on an equal we  
sent Nevada to Sierra on we?

E. No.

P. Military only as a guarantee.

Cl. A disclaimer they. What have faults -  
shows experiment.

1. How to get close, no?

Cl. About.

1. How to do it in Sierra.

Cl. Yes.

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1. Just the what our neg. but Reviser

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Cl. In fact, interests to see

- 1c Motivate 1. something to sign at summit. They estimate even more benevolent. So, most plan. 2) Technically, both ours in all fields. They'd be worried about what we do. 3) They are to some extent afraid of falling into it. Why? 1 of fact 2, not fact. What?

J. First guess. They 20 years from now. would believe of it. Whether they must be doing some work of some kind.

1. Clearly.

J. Tech on our side and etc.

J. My guess is once we get going, technical cycle.

1c. Gtd. 3 percent every.

J. For hostile purposes

W. and different things

1c In general, no diff between 2+3 in war, esp.

Cl. Right.

J. Clearly.

1c. Climate problem in our case

What ever get Pres down on climate

results would not show up to war but see

R + P could go forward.

J. Berlin could.

J. Our system, long term effects.

Cl. Open 2 says that. Under the  
any

E. R + P in procedure option at war time.

1. Inpsor to die R+D for recel + wor.  
Ch. Chaps Or you would make up  
next later.

1. A myin over, lade, in  
Refuse  
With a negon scemin, opt 1 exclude  
decide betw 2+3. Give in a brief  
<sup>mye</sup> ~~stems~~ 3 is easy. probib. 2 can  
not be probib. When we  
need more of our delegat. to any  
event we may then

Ch. we can do it in  
a weekly group do this ev 2 days + meet  
to focus.

OSD opt problem all long term issues.  
Weekly chips, 1 year. Still + Acda opt  
prohibit all hostile uses. Book from  
R+D. Practical diff negligible.

Let's look at scemin get in next few  
days

1. Consider following UN-X  
a. Frankly, our US answer need to block  
answer at UN. Let me merit for it  
OK.

10:57



HENRY  
KISSINGER  
L  
R

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1979  
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet  
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1a

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3725X

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT:

Minutes of the SRG Meeting held  
August 28, 1974

Attached are the minutes of the Senior Review Group meeting held August 28, 1974, to discuss Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare.


- cc: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
- Dr. David Elliott
- Richard Kennedy
- A. D. Clift

Attachments

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BY *WA* NARA DATE *12/21/05*



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SRG - Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare  
28 August 1974 10:37 - 10:57 a.m.

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SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING

August 28, 1974

Time and Place: 10:37 a.m. - 10:57 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

Participants:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Henry A. Kissinger	<u>ACDA:</u>	Dr. Fred Ikle Robert Miller Thomas Davies
<u>State:</u>	Robert Ingersoll Wreatham Gathright Helmut Sonnenfeldt	<u>NSC</u>	
<u>Defense:</u>	William Clements Robert Ellsworth Maj. Gen. W. Y. Smith	<u>Staff:</u>	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft Dr. David Elliott Michael Guhin Col. Clinton Granger James G. Barnum
<u>JCS:</u>	Lt. Gen. John Pauly		
<u>CIA:</u>	Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters 		

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

--The Working Group would draw up a negotiating scenario based on two premises: (1) that we would accept prohibitions on any military use of environmental modification techniques having long-term, widespread or especially severe effects (Option 2); and (2) that we would accept prohibitions on all military use of such techniques for hostile purposes (Option 3).

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Warfare 28 August 1974 10:37 - 10:57 a.m.

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Secretary Kissinger: The subject of today's meeting is environmental warfare. I don't think this will be a long meeting. What I would like to do is clarify the major positions--see what they are--and then get your judgment as to whether we can send them forward to the President by memo for decision or whether we need an NSC meeting. My instincts are that we can probably do it by memo, but I have no fixed opinion on that. Fred (Dr. Ikle) would you like to sum up the situation?

Dr. Ikle: I guess I should start at the latest development, the Soviet UN resolution, which calls for a broad agreement that would prohibit influencing the environment and climate for military and any other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security. This, of course, came after our joint agreement at the Moscow Summit. Prior to the Joint Communique, the interagency study came out with three basic options: (1) that there would be no restraints on military use of environmental warfare; (2) that there would be prohibitions on military use of environmental modification techniques if they have long-term, widespread, or especially severe effects; and (3) broad prohibitions against all military use of such techniques. As I see it, there are only two issues we need to discuss: (1) what are the various positions on the three options, and (2) how should we handle the diplomatic part--the negotiations coming up in October--and the Soviet's UN resolution.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm less worried about the UN than I am about how to handle the bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. What I would like somebody to explain to me is OSD's position. Would it be unfair to say that OSD would rule out options one and three?

Mr. Clements: Henry, what bothers us--what is at issue now--is that we have no idea of Soviet capabilities and intentions in this field. We just don't understand what their point is in wanting restraints on environmental warfare.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it seems to me that it is this--that they want it all banned. I guess you could argue that they are beginning to think about the consequences of no restraints on such type of warfare and that they are sincerely concerned. You could argue that they don't want an agreement. But, the fact is that we are committed to bilateral negotiations on this thing. What is it that OSD objects to in Option Three? What is Option Two banning? How does Option One differ from the others?

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SRG - Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare 28 August 1974 10:37 - 10:57 a.m.

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Mr. Clements: Well, we feel that the Soviet decision to have bilateral talks has really preempted Option One.

Secretary Kissinger: This is true if you preclude it as an outcome of negotiations. But, what I'd like to get to--how is Option Two different from Option One?

Mr. Ellsworth: What Option Two does is prohibit the use of such things as earthquakes and tidal waves--that type of thing. Most of those things we're talking about in Option Two we don't have the capability or technology to do anyway.

Mr. Ingersoll: We can create earthquakes.

Secretary Kissinger: Not really. I remember all that fuss about the underground explosion in the Aleutians. Everybody thought that would create earthquakes, and it never happened.

Mr. Miller: Basically, Option Two would prohibit actions that would have long-term applications.

Secretary Kissinger: I know, but that's all double-talk. Just what sort of things would be prohibited under Option Two?

Mr. Ingersoll: Things that we don't know much about right now. I mean, tidal waves and those sorts of things we can't do. We're just speculating on things that we might be able to do in the years to come.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we are talking about things that we are not presently capable of doing.

Mr. Ingersoll: That's right, except for earthquakes.

Mr. Miller: And we can't do that unless the enemy moves onto the fault first!

Mr. Ingersoll: Well, we really don't know what we can do yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Just for my own education, is it possible to start an earthquake here and have it produce results somewhere else? I mean, you can't start an earthquake in Nevada and send it to Siberia, can you?

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Mr. Ellsworth: No, you can't.

Gen. Pauly: The military utility of such an action is questionable anyway.

Mr. Clements: Earthquakes are disruptive things, Henry. They create a lot of havoc under the ground. They shear off oil drilling equipment, pipes, that sort of thing. Besides, they have to occur where there is a fault, like San Andreas.

Secretary Kissinger: Then you would have to get close to create an earthquake, no?

Mr. Clements: That's right, right on the spot.

Secretary Kissinger: We'd have to do it in Siberia then?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in this case, it seems a pity to me to ask for a bunch of studies just to have to give them up later. How do we conduct the negotiations with the Russians? How does OSD understand the options?

Mr. Clements: Our problem is that we don't understand the Russian motivation for an agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: I can understand their motivation. Number one, they probably wanted something to sign at the Summit. Number two, their technology is behind ours in almost all fields. They just might be worried about what we are doing and this would be a way to find out. Number three, they might be on to something and they want to prevent us from following them into it. Which of the three, I don't know, but I would think it would be one of the first two. That's just a gut feeling. Hal (Mr. Sonnenfeldt) what do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, first I think they are under some pressure to think about twenty years from now. No more than us, they don't want to spend billions of dollars on projects that may have no application. I think they must be doing some work of some kind on weather modification that we don't know about.

Secretary Kissinger: Clearly. Does Option Three prevent everything?

Mr. Ingersoll: Only techniques intended for hostile purposes.

Gen. Walters: And that is difficult to verify.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that in peacetime there is no

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difference between Options Two and Three. In wartime, yes.

Mr. Clements: Yes, that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, whatever options we present to the President for decision, the operational results would not show up until there is a war, anyway. Research and development could go forward.

Mr. Ingersoll: It's impossible to distinguish whether research and development are being used for peaceful purposes or war in this circumstance.

Secretary Kissinger: In the event of a major war, I think we would have to reassess our position. I think they would too. Would someone here write a negotiating scenario that we can give the President. I think that Option One is excluded, we really have to decide only between Option Two or Three. Option Three is easy, it prohibits everything. Option Two centers on military uses that would not be prohibited. What we need is clearer instructions for our delegation.

Mr. Clements: We can work up the scenario.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have a working group? Let's have the working group do this and have it in a couple of days. Then I can move it on up to the President for decision. I'd like a negotiating scenario to send along.

As I understand it, the OSD option prohibits long-term uses of technical means to change the environment. The State and ACDA option would prohibit all hostile uses. Both positions permit research and development. The practical differences are really quite negligible.

Dr. Ikle: Would you like to consider the Russian UN resolution in the scenario?

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, the bilateral negotiations are being used as a device to block discussion of this issue at the UN. We want to get that into a UN study group or something. So, we really won't face the UN problem. Okay, thank you.

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Review Group, August 1974



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SRG - Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare 28 August 1974 10:37 - 10:57 a.m.

MR. JIM BARNUM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE POLICE

The following list of officials will be attending a meeting this morning at 10:30 a.m., in the White House Situation Room:

- State: Robert Ingersoll ✓  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt ✓  
Wreatham Gathright ✓
- Defense: William Clements ✓  
Robert Ellsworth ✓  
Maj. Gen. W. Y. Smith ✓
- JCS: Lt. Gen. John Pauly ✓
- CIA: Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters  
[REDACTED] ✓
- ACDA: Dr. Fred Ikle ✓  
Robert Miller ✓  
Thomas Davies ✓

NOTE: Gen. Brown (JCS) is out of town and Mr. Colby is on leave.

*Atop  
Snowing  
Relian  
Walter  
Graham  
Barnum*

eddy palanzo  
(x-3440)



August 1974

12-1  
12-2

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SRG  
on  
Environmental  
Warfare  
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DATE 12/21/05

SRG - Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare  
28 August 1974 10:37 - 10:57 a.m.

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Kissinger: I'm less worried about the U.N. than I am about how to handle the bilateral negotiations with the Soviets. What I would like somebody to explain to me is OSD's position. Would it be unfair to say that OSD would rule out ~~options 1 and 3~~ one and three?

Clements: Henry, what bothers us--what is at issue now--is that we have no idea of Soviet capabilities and intentions in this field. We just don't understand what their point is in wanting ~~restraints~~ restraints on environmental warfare.

Kissinger: Well, it seems to me that it is this--that they want it all banned. I guess ~~you~~ <sup>could</sup> ~~good~~ argue that they are beginning to think about the consequences of no ~~restraints~~ restraints on such type of warfare and the



2

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Kissinger? In the event of a major war, I think we would <sup>have to</sup> reassess our <sup>I think she would too,</sup> negotiating position. Would someone here write a ~~negotiations~~ scenario that we can give the President. I think that Option One is excluded, we really have to decide only between Option Two or Three. Option Three is easy, it prohibits everything. Option Two centers on military uses that would not be prohibited. What we need is ~~more~~ clearer instructions for our delegation.

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*As* As I understand it, the OSD ~~option~~ option prohibits ~~all~~ long-term uses of technical means to change the environment. <sup>The</sup> State and ACDA option would prohibit all hostile uses ~~of~~ Both positions permit research and development. The practical differences are really quite negligible.

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